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Fair remote data retrievalCloud computing is emerging as the next-generation IT architecture. However, cloud computing also
raises security and privacy concerns since the users have no physical control over the outsourced data.
This paper focuses on fairly retrieving encrypted private medical records outsourced to remote untrusted
cloud servers in the case of medical accidents and disputes. Our goal is to enable an independent com-
mittee to fairly recover the original private medical records so that medical investigation can be carried
out in a convincing way. We achieve this goal with a fair remote retrieval (FRR) model in which either t
investigation committee members cooperatively retrieve the original medical data or none of them can
get any information on the medical records. We realize the ﬁrst FRR scheme by exploiting fair multi-
member key exchange and homomorphic privately veriﬁable tags. Based on the standard computational
Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) assumption, our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model (ROM). A
detailed performance analysis and experimental results show that our scheme is efﬁcient in terms of
communication and computation.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Cloud servers (CS) can provide shared resources, software and
information to remote clients over a network such as Internet.
The clients can access the CS through a web browser or a smart-
phone application, while the business software and data are stored
on the CS at a remote location. An important application of cloud
computing is to store medical documents from electronic health
networks (EHNs) in order to facilitate the exchange of health infor-
mation between healthcare organizations, clinical research organi-
zations, healthcare payers and public health agencies. Each day, an
EHN generates and records numerous medical documents, includ-
ing medical images, medical check reports, clinical reports, medical
prescriptions, patient monitoring reports, and so on [1,2]. These
documents are sensitive and need to be protected, so that only
authorized parties can access them. It is preferable to employ cloud
servers to store and maintain such a large number of medical doc-
uments, because the cloud reduces cost and offers universal
accessibility.Cloud computing poses some security problems: remote data
integrity checking, remote data retrieval and data privacy. For
example, CS may neglect keeping or may deliberately delete rarely
accessed data of some clients. Thus, it is important to enable the
client to easily check the integrity of the outsourced data without
downloading the entire database. Furthermore, the remotely
stored data may need to be used in the future; therefore, the client
must have the ability to retrieve his/her data anywhere anytime.
To achieve data privacy, a general approach is to let the clients en-
crypt their data before uploading them to CS. The encryption can
be elegantly designed to allow searching encrypted data or retriev-
ing data with speciﬁc content. To improve the robustness of data
retrieval, error-correcting codes can be used before the data are
stored at the CS.1.1. Related work
The provable data possession (PDP) model, introduced by Ateni-
ese et al. [3], performs a probabilistic check and is designed to
catch a misbehaving CS deleting or altering a ﬁle outsourced by a
client. In [3] Ateniese et al. also instantiated two non-dynamic
PDP schemes that are provably secure in the random oracle model.
Subsequently, they proposed a dynamic PDP security model and
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Fig. 1. A medical investigation system.
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the insert operation. Fully dynamic PDP was realized by Erway
et al. based on an authenticated ﬂip table [5]. Independently,
Sebé et al. designed an efﬁcient PDP scheme by using the problem
of factoring large integers [6]. Since then, several variants of the
original PDP models and new instantiations have been proposed.
Wang et al. studied proxy PDP [7], cooperative PDP [8] and iden-
tity-based PDP [9,10]. Zhu et al. proposed the concept of coopera-
tive PDP for hybrid clouds [11,12]. Curtmola et al. proposed the
multiple-replica PDP [13]. Yu et al. studied the security and pri-
vacy-preserving problems in remote data integrity checking
[14,15].
Proofs of Retrievability (PoRs) is an enhanced model to guaran-
tee that the clients can retrieve their remotely stored data. The
above PDP model ensures that the clients will catch with high
probability a misbehaving CS who modiﬁed the clients’ ﬁles. How-
ever, secure remote data storage is only part of the client’s require-
ments. The clients must be able to retrieve the remote data no
matter whether the misbehaving CS was caught or not. This gap
is ﬁlled by the PoRs model [16,17] that ensures that the clients
can deﬁnitely retrieve their data. In the PoRs model, CS proves to
a client that it is actually storing the entire data of the client and
the client can retrieve the data anytime anywhere. In a multi-client
setting, Zheng et al. more recently proposed a fair and dynamic
PoRs model and a corresponding scheme [18]. Since then, several
variants of the original PoRs models and new instantiations have
been proposed. Bower et al. concluded the theory and implemen-
tation of PoRs [19]. Dodis et al. proposed novel PoRs via hardness
ampliﬁcation [20]. Zhu et al. proposed the zero-knowledge proofs
of retrievability [21].
Efforts have been also devoted to privacy and management of
outsourced data. Wan et al. proposed hierarchical attribute-set-
based encryption by extending ciphertext-policy attribute-set-
based encryption with a hierarchical structure of users [22]. The
encryption approach can be added to PoRs to simultaneously
achieve data privacy and retrievability [23].
1.2. Motivation and contribution
In this paper, we study the security and privacy concerns in
medical investigation in EHNs. In such a scenario, numerous med-
ical records are encrypted and stored in a CS. Unlike in other cloud
storage applications, here the CS, the hospital and the patients may
be interested in dishonestly modifying the outsourced medical
data. Hence, an independent third party is employed to guarantee
the integrity and the retrievability of the outsourced data. Further,
when medical investigation is performed in the case of medical
accidents, the third party should be able to recover the original
medical records in a fair way. We argue that an independent third
party is necessary since both the hospital and the patients might
tamper with the original medical records or refuse to decrypt the
encrypted records if the original records could be used as argu-
ments against them in a dispute.
Motivated by the above application, we present a fair remote
retrieval (FRR) model in EHNs. We capture the data privacy,
retrievability and fairness requirements in such applications. To
achieve data privacy, private medical records need to be encrypted
before they are outsourced to cloud servers so that curious CS can-
not understand the content of the stored data. In FRR, t of n coop-
erating medical committee members should be able to check
whether the data are kept intact or not. Further, the t cooperating
members should be also able to recover the original data if neces-
sary; however, if less than t members collude, they must not be
able to obtain any information about the outsourced data, which
guarantees fairness in medical investigation in the case of medical
accidents or disputes.1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the
problem to be investigated and deﬁnes the systemmodel. Section 3
describes our FRR scheme and proves its security. Section 4 evalu-
ates our scheme in terms of computation and communication cost.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. System model and security requirements
In this section, we present a functional FRR model in EHNs
(Section 2.1) and then formally deﬁne its security requirements
(Section 2.2). Our FRR system considers the following scenario: a
hospital uploads the patients’ private medical records to a CS
maintained by a cloud service provider; the provider is not
assumed to be trustable; speciﬁcally, the provider may be curious
and occasionally misbehave, e.g., by deleting or modifying some
parts of the medical records; a medical committee of n members
is employed to validate whether the records have been kept intact;
the committee can also recover the records if required.
2.1. FRR system model
An FRR system, as shown in Fig. 1, comprises ﬁve types of par-
ticipants: Patient, Hospital, CS, Committee and Semi-Trusted Neu-
tral Party (STNP). They are described as follows.
1. Patient: When a patient goes to the hospital for health treat-
ment, private medical records are generated and encrypted by
the patient.
2. Hospital: The hospital helps the patient to create some private
medical records. After receiving the patient’s encrypted medical
records, the hospital uploads them to the CS.
3. CS: CS has signiﬁcant storage space and computational
resources to maintain the data from the hospitals. However,
CS may also occasionally misbehave and modify some parts of
the stored data.
4. Committee: This is the third party trusted by the patient and
the hospital to solve a medical tangle; this is a situation in
which the patients (or their family members) query the hospi-
tal’s course of treatment and are not satisﬁed with the hospital’s
reply. In such a situation, the patient and the hospital may
appeal to the committee of medical tangle, which consists of
n independent members who do not necessarily trust each
other. At least t members must cooperate in a fair exchange
in order to recover the original patient data.
5. STNP: The Semi-Trusted Neutral Party (STNP) is selected on a
case-by-case basis and asked to aid in the execution of a fair
multi-member exchange among the independent committee
members. STNP is trusted to ensure the fairness of the multi-
member exchange, that is, all members trust it to honestly
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ing members. However, it is not assumed to be fully trusted by
the members. In particular, STNP is not allowed to see the ﬁnal
exchanged secret shares of the members; hence, a malicious
STNP cannot get the private medical records as long as the
number of dishonest members is less than t  1. The members
can request STNP’s intervention in case of dispute. If there is
no dispute, STNP stays ofﬂine. If there exists a dispute, STNP
stays online.Cloud Server
2
4
5
Patient Hospital
6
STNP
1
3
M1 M2 ... Mt ... Mn
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Fig. 2. FRR scheme architecture.Deﬁnition 1 (FRR scheme). An FRR scheme among untrusted
members, CS, hospital and patient, and utilizing STNP, is a collec-
tion of eight probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,
TagGen, CheckTag, GroupBarter, GenProof, GenRetrieval, Verify,
Extract) such that:
1. KeyGenð1kÞ ! ðpk; skÞ is a probabilistic polynomial-time key
generation algorithm, where k is the security parameter. CS
runs the algorithm KeyGen to obtain its own pair ðy;YÞ of pri-
vate/public keys. The hospital runs the algorithm KeyGen to
obtain its own pair ðz; ZÞ of private/public keys. On the other
hand, the patient runs the algorithm KeyGen to get a pair
ðs;vÞ of matching private/public keys. Then the patient distrib-
utes the shares s1; s2; . . . ; sn of the private key s to the corre-
sponding committee members. This phase produces the
system parameters which are denoted by param.
2. TagGenðs;mÞ ! Tm is a polynomial-time algorithm run by the
patient to generate the veriﬁcation metadata. On input the pri-
vate key s and a ﬁle block m, it returns the veriﬁcation tag Tm.
Then, with the help of the hospital, the patient uploads the
block-tag pairs ðm; TmÞ to CS. Some corresponding metadata will
be kept by the patient and the hospital.
3. CheckTagðmi; Ti; param;Y ; Z; vÞ ! f‘‘success’’, ‘‘failure’’g is a
polynomial-time algorithm run by CS to check whether a
block-tag pair is valid. It takes as input a block-tag pair
ðmi; TiÞ and the public keys of CS, the hospital and the patient;
it returns ‘‘success’’ or ‘‘failure’’. ‘‘Success’’ denotes that the pair
is valid and ‘‘failure’’ denotes that it is invalid.
4. GroupBarterðs10 ; . . . ; st0 Þ ! s is a polynomial-time algorithm
fairly run by t committee members with the help of STNP. It
takes as input t secret shares s10 ; . . . ; st0 which are distributed
in the phase KeyGen, and returns the ﬁnal private key s. Fair
running ensures that either the t participating members obtain
the private key s or no member obtains it. s can be used to
decrypt the patient’s private records.
5. GenProofðF; chal;RÞ ! V is run by CS in order to realize the
remote data integrity checking and the retrieval protocol. It
takes as inputs an ordered collection F of blocks, a challenge
chal and an ordered collection R of veriﬁcation metadata which
corresponds to the blocks in F. It returns V for the blocks in F
that are determined by the challenge chal.
6. GenRetrievalðF;Rchal;RÞ ! V is run by CS. It takes as inputs an
ordered collection F of blocks, a challenge Rchal and an ordered
collection R of veriﬁcation metadata which corresponds to the
blocks in F. It returns V that corresponds to the challenge Rchal.
7. Verifyððz; ZÞ; chal;VÞ ! b 2 f0;1g is run by the hospital to check
whether the response V is valid. ‘‘1’’ denotes valid; ‘‘0’’ denotes
invalid.
8. Verify-Retrieveðs10 ; s20 ; . . . ; st0 ;Rchal;VÞ ! M is run by the mem-
bers of the medical tangle expert committee to retrieve the
remote private medical records M. It takes as inputs the chal-
lenge Rchal, the shares ðs10 ; s20 ; . . . ; st0 Þ of the patient’s private
key s, and the corresponding response V. The members verify
the response V and get the remote private medical records M
if successful.Note. The step Verify-Retrieve can also be performed by the
patient since it owns the private key s.
An FRR scheme should be correct. Correctness requires that, for
the keypairs ðy;YÞ; ðz; ZÞ and ðs;vÞ output by KeyGen, for all ﬁle
block-tag pairs ðmi; TiÞ output by TagGen, the veriﬁcation algorithm
accepts the response V when interacting with the honest CS.
2.2. Security requirements in FRR
We now formally deﬁne the security properties: unforgeability
against untrusted CS, retrievability, and threshold fairness among
the untrusted clients.
Deﬁnition 2 (Unforgeability against untrusted CS). An FRR scheme
is unforgeable against any probabilistic polynomial-time untrusted
CS if the probability that any such CS wins the FRR game below is
negligible. We denominate the untrusted CS as the adversary A.
The FRR game is described below:1. Setup: The challenger is denoted by C. C obtains CS’s public–
private key pair ðpks; sksÞ  KeyGenð1kÞ. It obtains the Client’s
public–private key pair (pkc; skc)  KeyGen (1k). Then, C sends
ðparams; pks; sks; pkcÞ to A (i.e., untrusted CS) and keeps the pri-
vate key skc conﬁdential.
2. First-Phase Queries: A adaptively makes different queries to C
as listed below:
 Hash queries. A makes hash queries adaptively and C
responds to them.
 Tag queries. Amakes block-tag pair queries adaptively. For a
query mi issued by A; C computes the tag
Ti  TagGenðskc;miÞ and sends it back to A. Without loss
of generality, let ðmi; TiÞ be the queried block-tag pairs for
index i 2 I1.
3. Challenge: C generates a challenge chal which deﬁnes an
ordered queried index collection fi1; i2; . . . ; icg, where
fi1; i2; . . . ; icg  I1 and c is a positive integer. In the index set
fi1; i2; . . . ; icg, at least there exists one corresponding
mij ð1 6 j 6 cÞ that has never been queried by A.
4. Second-Phase Queries: Similar to the First-Phase Queries. Sup-
pose that ðmi; TiÞ is the queried and answered block-tag pair
for index i 2 I2, where I2 is the queried and answered block-
tag pair index set. The restriction is that fi1; i2; . . . ; icg  I1 [ I2.
5. Forge: A computes an integrity proof V for the blocks indicated
by chal and returns V to C.
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CS if the adversary A wins the FRR game with negligible proba-
bility.
Now, we deﬁne the property of retrievability where the adver-
sary A is still an untrusted CS. For A 6 , an -adversary A replies
correctly to a fraction of at least 1 A challenges over the lifetime
of the ﬁle.
Deﬁnition 3 (ð; cÞ-Retrievability). An FRR scheme against the
untrusted cloud is an ð; cÞ-valid proof of retrievability if for
every polynomial-time -adversary A (i.e., untrusted cloud), the
probability that Verify-Retrieve outputs the correct stored ﬁle
M is c.Deﬁnition 4 (Threshold fairness of FRR with STNP among untrusted
members). Suppose the set of committee members is S and the
number of members is jSj ¼ n0. The threshold value is t. The FRR
scheme with STNP against untrusted members satisﬁes the prop-
erty of ðt;n0Þ-threshold fairness if it satisﬁes the following
conditions.
1. Any t or more honest members can cooperate to check and
retrieve the remote data. If there exist dishonest members
among the t members, the t members cannot check or retrieve
the remote data.
2. Any t  1 or less members cannot check or retrieve the remote
data.
3. Proposed FRR scheme for untrusted clients and CS
In this section, we recall some mathematical background
(Section 3.1) and then we present our pairing-based FRR scheme
to fairly protect the hospital and the patients in the case of medical
accident investigation (Section 3.2). Then, in Section 3.3, we ana-
lyze the correctness and security of our scheme, which is shown
to satisfy provable security in the ROM.
3.1. Basic mathematical background
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same
prime order q, i.e., jG1j ¼ jG2j ¼ q. Let e : G1  G1 ! G2 be a bilinear
map which satisﬁes the following properties: (1) Bilinearity:
8Q ;R; S 2 G1 and a; b 2 Zq; eðRa;QbÞ ¼ eðR;QÞab. (2) Non-degener-
acy: 9Q ;R 2 G1 such that eðQ ;RÞ – 1G2 . (3) Computability:
8Q ;R 2 G1, there is an efﬁcient algorithm to calculate eðQ ;RÞ.
We can construct such a bilinear map e based on the modiﬁed
Weil pairings [24] or Tate pairings [25] on elliptic curves over ﬁnite
ﬁelds. A group with such a map e is called a bilinear group. Our
scheme is proven to be secure under some well-understood com-
putational difﬁculty assumptions in the random oracle model.
Let P be the generator of G1. Now, given unknown a; b; c 2 Zq
and P; Pa; Pb; Pc 2 G1, it holds that there exists an efﬁcient algorithm
to determine whether ab ¼ c mod q by verifying eðPa; PbÞ ¼ eðP; PÞc
in polynomial time (Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman or DDH problem),
while there exists no efﬁcient algorithm to compute Pab 2 G1 with
non-negligible probability within polynomial time (Computational
Difﬁe–Hellman or CDH problem); see [26] for details. A group
where DDH is easy and CDH is hard is called a co-GDH group;
hence, G1 is a co-GDH group.
3.2. Scheme construction
In order to give the intuition of our FRR scheme construction, its
architecture is given in Fig. 2. There are ﬁve entities: patient,hospital, cloud server, committee and STNP. Parameters t and n0
are determined by the patient, the committee and STNP. STNP is
used for the multi-member fair exchange. The architecture can
be outlined as follows:
r The patient goes to the hospital for health treatment. With
the help of the hospital, he gets his own private medical
records. The patient encrypts these medical records.
s The hospital uploads these encrypted private medical
records to the cloud server.
t A medical tangle happens between the patient and the hos-
pital. The patient and the hospital appeal to the committee.
u The patient distributes the secret shares fs1; s2; . . . ; sn0 g to all
committee members fM1;M2; . . . ;Mn0 g.
vWithout loss of generality, we let the threshold be t and the
active member subset be fM1;M2; . . . ;Mtg. The entities
fSTNP;M1;M2; . . . ;Mtg perform the threshold fair multi-member
key exchange.
w The members M1;M2; . . . ;Mt interact with the cloud server
and retrieve the remote medical records.
We next describe our scheme in detail and start by introducing
some additional notation used in the construction. Suppose the
maximum number of block-tag pairs is n. Let f and w be two pseu-
do-random functions. Let H; h; H1 and h1 be cryptographic hash
functions. The functions mentioned in this paragraph can be de-
ﬁned as follows:f : Zq  f1;2; . . . ;ng ! Zq; x : f1;2; . . . ;ng ! Zq; H : G2
! Zq; H1 : f0;1g ! Zq; h : Zq ! G1; h1 : f0;1g ! Zq:
Let fzðiÞ denote the function f with input i and trapdoor z. Let g be a
generator of G1 and g be a generator of Zq, where q is the order of G1
and G2. The phases of our FRR scheme are described below.
KeyGen: CS picks a random number y 2 Zq as its private key and
computes Y ¼ gy as its public key. The hospital picks a random
number z 2 Zq as its private key and computes Z ¼ gz as its public
key. The patient picks a random number s 2 Zq and computes
v ¼ gs. Then, it picks a random polynomial f^ ðxÞ of degree
t  1 : f^ ðxÞ ¼ sþ a1xþ a2x2 þ    þ at1xt1, where ai 2 Zq and
1 6 i 6 t  1. For n0 different members M1;M2; . . . ;Mn0 , the patient
performs the following steps:
1. For 1 6 i 6 n0, compute di ¼ H1ðMiÞ and si ¼ f^ ðdiÞ. Then, send si
to the member Mi via a secure channel.
2. For 1 6 i 6 n0, compute Pi ¼ gsi and make them public.
Then, the patient picks a random element u 2 G1 and its public
key is fu;vg. The patient’s private key is s and the private key
shares are fsi;1 6 i 6 n0g.
TagGen (s, F, i). Given the ﬁle F, the patient encrypts F by using a
symmetric encryption algorithm E and the private key s of the pa-
tient. Suppose the ciphertext is bF ¼ EsðFÞ. Then, the patient applies
an erasure code on bF to obtain F 0. Then, the patient splits F 0 into l
blocks F 0 ¼ ð m1; m2; . . . ; mlÞ for some positive integer l. To generate
the tag Ti that corresponds to the block mi, the patient performs
the following procedures:
1. Compute mi ¼ h1ð miÞ; d ¼ HðeðY ; ZÞsÞ and generate Wi ¼ xdðiÞ.
2. Compute Ti ¼ ðhðWiÞumi Þs and output ðTi;WiÞ.
As soon as the patient generates the l block tags, the hospital
uploads all the block-tag pairs fð mi; TiÞ;1 6 i 6 lg to CS.
CheckTag(fðmi; TiÞ;1 6 i 6 lg). Given fð mi; TiÞ;1 6 i 6 lg, CS per-
forms the following procedures for every i;1 6 i 6 l:
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2. Verify whether eðTi; gÞ¼? eðhðcWiÞumi ;vÞ holds.
3. If it holds, it is valid and it is stored in CS. Otherwise, it is
rejected.
Notes: In CheckTag, CS can perform the batch checking as
follows. After receiving the l block-tag pairs fð mi; TiÞ; 1 6 i 6 lg,
CS picks l random ai 2 Zq and computes mi ¼ h1ð miÞ; T ¼
Ql
j¼1T
aj
j ;
m0 ¼Plj¼1ajmj. If eðT; gÞ¼? e Qlj¼1hðxdðjÞÞajum0 ;v  holds, these l
block-tag pairs are accepted; otherwise, CS can get the invalid
block-tag pairs by dichotomizing the search and then reject them.
GroupBarter. t members cooperate to perform fair exchange in
order to check and retrieve remote private medical records. Let
the t members’ identity set be fMc1 ;Mc2 ; . . . ;Mctg. They do as
follows:
1. For i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg; Mi picks a random ri 2 Zq, computes
s^i ¼ si  ri mod ðq 1Þ and Ri ¼ gri mod q, and makes Ri public.
2. For i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg; Mi sends s^i to STNP through a secure
channel.
3. For i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg; Mi sends ri to Mj; j– i and
j 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg.
4. For j 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg, when Mj receives r^i; Mj checks whether
gr^i ¼? Ri mod q holds. If it holds, Mj accepts ri and sends a sign
yji ¼ 1 to STNP through a secure channel; otherwise, Mj rejects
ri.
5. For i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg, STNP checks: Pi ¼? gs^i Ri mod q. If it holds,
STNP accepts s^i; otherwise, STNP rejects it.
6. When STNP receives the t responses fðs^c1 ;Rc1 Þ; ðs^c2 ;Rc2 Þ; . . . ;
ðs^ct ;Rct Þg and tðt  1Þ signs fyji; i; j 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg; i – jg, it
broadcasts S ¼ fs^c1 ; s^c2 ; . . . ; s^ctg to all the clients fMc1 ; . . . ;Mctg.
7. For i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg;Mi computes sj ¼ s^j þ rj mod ðq 1Þ,
where j– i. Then, by using the Lagrange interpolation method,
Mi obtainss ¼ f^ ð0Þ ¼
Xt
j¼1
scj
Yt
r¼1;r–j
H1ðMcr Þ
H1ðMcj Þ  H1ðMcr Þ
 !
mod qThus, after GroupBarter, every member can get the private key s.
GenProof(pk;M¼ ð m1; m2; . . . ; mlÞ; chal;R ¼ ðT1; . . . ; TlÞ). Let the
hospital’s integrity challenge be chal ¼ l0; k; i1; i2; . . . ; il0
 
. After
receiving the challenge chal, CS performs the following steps:
1. For 1 6 j 6 l0, compute aj ¼ fkðjÞ, and mij ¼ h1ð mij Þ. Then, com-
pute T ¼Ql0j¼1Tajij ; m0 ¼Pl0j¼1ajmij .
2. Output V ¼ ðT;m0Þ to the hospital as the response to chal.
GenRetrieval(pk;M¼ ð m1; m2; . . . ; mlÞ;Rchal;R¼ ðT1; . . . ;TlÞ). Let
the committee members’ Verify-Retrieve challenge be
Rchal¼ fi1; i2; . . . ; il0 g. Then, CS sends V 0 ¼ fð mij ;Tij Þ;16 j6 l0g to the
members.
Verifyððpk; skÞ; chal;VÞ. For the hospital’s challenge-response
pair ðchal;VÞ, the hospital veriﬁes the response V as follows:
1. Compute d ¼ Hðeðv;YÞzÞ and check: eðT; gÞ¼? e Ql0j¼1hðxdðjÞÞfkðjÞ
um0 ; vÞ.
2. If it holds, accept this response. Otherwise, reject it.
Verify-Retrieveðpk; sk;Rchal;V 0Þ. After receiving the medical tan-
gle, the members of the committee query the medical records
Rchal ¼ f1;2; . . . ; lg. Every member Mi; i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg performs
the following steps:
1. For 1 6 j 6 l, pick the random coefﬁcients of the blocks ai;j 2 Zq
and compute mj ¼ h1ð mjÞ; Ti ¼
Ql
j¼1T
ai;j
j ; m
0
i ¼
Pl
j¼1ai;jmj2. Compute d ¼ HðeðY; ZÞsÞ and check: eðTi; gÞ¼? e
Ql
j¼1hðxdðjÞÞai;j

um
0
i ;vÞ. If it holds, accept the records. Otherwise, reject them
and exit the protocol.
3. Obtain F 0 ¼ ð m1; m2; . . . ; mlÞ. Then, get bF by eraser decoding on
F 0. After that, retrieve F ¼ DsðbFÞ by using s to decrypt bF , where
D is the symmetric decryption algorithm that corresponds to E.
In this way, all theMi; i 2 fc1; c2; . . . ; ctg can fairly check and re-
trieve the remote private medical records M.
Notes: Since s is also known to the patient, the patient can also
verify and retrieve his own remote medical records. On the other
hand, s is unknown to the hospital, so the hospital cannot retrieve
the patient’s remote medical records although it can verify their
integrity.
3.3. Correctness and security analysis
The security analysis of our FRR scheme is given by the follow-
ing lemmas and theorems. Due to the page limits, the detailed pro-
cess can be seen in the Appendix. Theorem 1 shows that our
protocol can ensure the property of threshold fairness.
Theorem 1. In the GroupBarter phase, our FRR scheme realizes multi-
member threshold fair key exchange with STNP. The advantage of an
adversary A (i.e., a dishonest member), is 1q where q is the order of the
ﬁeld Zq, which is negligible.Proof. Given in Appendix 1. hLemma 1. If the patient and CS are honest, i.e., they follow the pro-
posed phases, then any block-tag pair can pass CS’s tag checking,
i.e., the CheckTag phase satisﬁes correctness.Proof. Given in Appendix 2. hLemma 2. If the hospital and CS are honest, i.e., they follow the pro-
posed phases, response V can pass the hospital’s integrity checking, i.e.,
the Verify phase satisﬁes correctness.Proof. Given in Appendix 3. hLemma 3. If the members and CS are honest, i.e., they follow the pro-
posed phases, all members can retrieve the remote medical records,
i.e., the Verify-Retrieve phase satisﬁes correctness.Proof. Given in Appendix 4. h
Lemmas 1–3 have shown the correctness results. We now turn
to security results. Lemma 4 shows that a single Tag is existentially
unforgeable.
Lemma 4. Let (G1;G2) be a (t0; 0)-co-GDH group pair of order q. Then
the tag generation scheme on ðG1;G2Þ is ð^t; qS; qh; Þ-secure against
existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-message attack for all t
and  satisfying 0 P e^ðqSþ1Þ and t
0 6 t^ þ cG1 ðqh þ 2qSÞ þ ceðqH  1Þ,
where cG1 is a constant that depends on G1; e^ is the base of the natural
logarithm, and qS; qh are the number of Tag queries and h-queries,
respectively; cG1 denotes the time cost of exponentiation on G1; ce
denotes the time cost of bilinear pairings.Proof. Given in Appendix 5. h
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in Lemma 4), a forged grouped tag-block pair ðT; m^Þ can pass the ver-
iﬁcation with probability less than 1q, which is negligible.Proof. Given in Appendix 6. hLemma 6. If some block-tag pairs ð ml; TlÞ; l 2 M1# fi1; i2; . . . ; icg
are modiﬁed, CS can substitute the other valid block-tag pairs
ð ml^; Tl^; l^ 2 M2 for ð ml; TlÞ; l 2M1 only with negligible probability.Proof. Given in Appendix 7. hTheorem 2. Let ðG1;G2Þ be a ðt0; 0Þ-co-GDH group pair of order q.
Then a grouped message-tag is ð^t; qS; qh; Þ-secure against existential
forgery under an adaptive chosen-message attack (in the ROM) for
all t^ and  satisfying min e^ðqS þ 1Þ0; 1q
n o
P  and t0 6 t^þ
cG1 ðqh þ 2qSÞ þ ceðqH  1Þ, where cG1 is a constant that depends on
G1; e^ is the base of the natural logarithm, and qS; qh are the number
of Tag queries and h-queries, respectively; cG1 denotes the time cost
of exponentiation on G1; ce denotes the time cost of bilinear pairings.Proof. Given in Appendix 8. h
According to Lemmas 1–3, our FRR scheme satisﬁes the prop-
erty of correctness. Putting these lemmas together with Theorems
1 and 2, we can assert that our FRR scheme is provably secure in
the ROM.4. Performance analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the performance of our pro-
posed FRR protocol in terms of computation and communication
costs (Section 4.1). Then, in Section 4.2, we report on empirical
ﬁgures obtained from an implementation of the solution.Fig. 3. Computation time for the patient.
Fig. 4. Computation time for the hospital.4.1. Theoretical analysis
Computation. Suppose there exist l message blocks. In the Tag-
Gen phase, the patient needs 1 pairing, 2l exponentiations and l
multiplications over G1. In the CheckTag phase, CS needs 1 pairing,
2l exponentiations and l multiplications. In the GroupBarter phase,
every member needs 2ðt  1Þ exponentiations and STNP needs t
multiplications. In the GenProof phase, CS needs l exponentiations
and l 1 multiplications. In the Verify phase, the hospital needs 3
pairings, lþ 1 exponentiations and l multiplications. In the Verify-
Retrieve phase, the members need 3 pairings, 2lþ 1 exponentia-
tions and 2l 1 multiplications. Other operations, such as hashing,
exponentiation, and multiplication in the group Zq, are omitted
since they just contribute a negligible computation cost compared
with the cost of the multiplication and exponentiation operations
in G1. This previously listed computational costs are totally tolera-
ble with current computing devices.
Communication. The communication overhead mostly comes
from the queries and responses. In the hospital query phase, if
the number of queried blocks is l0, the hospital needs to send
l0 þ 2 elements in Zq to CS. In the response, CS needs to send 1 ele-
ment in G1 and 1 element in Zq to the hospital. In the member
query phase, if the number of queried blocks is l, every member
needs to send l elements in Zq to CS. In the response, CS needs to
send l elements in Zq to the members. This communication over-
head is totally tolerable with current communication technology.4.2. Experimental analysis
In order to study the performance of our scheme, we have
implemented a prototype. The tests were run on an ASUS S56C
Laptop with the following settings:
 CPU: Intel Core i7-3517U @ 1.90 GHz.
 Physical Memory: 4 GB DDR3 1600 MHz.
 OS: Ubuntu 13.04 Linux 3.8.0-19-generic SMP i686.
Our code was written in Java7, using the java-7-openjdk-i386
environment. Java is slower than, for example, C when it comes
to high-demand computations, but, considering that parts of this
protocol might be run in mobile devices and that some of the most
important cloud service providers run their systems in Java, the
choice of this environment is reasonable.
We used the Java Pairing Based Cryptography Library (jPBC,
[27]), which is a port of the PBC library [28]. Our choice of elliptic
curve was Type A (see Chapter 8 of [29]), with jrj ¼ 160 bits and
jqj ¼ 512 bits, making elements in ZIq 160 bits long and elements
in G1 1024 bits long. Considering a scenario with l message blocks
Fig. 5. Computation time for the members with precomputation.
Fig. 6. Computation time for the members without precomputation.
Fig. 8. Computation time for the cloud service.
232 H. Wang et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 226–233and t members in the committee, we present the performance re-
sults for each of the actors of the protocol, namely the patients, the
CS, the hospital and the STNP, for different values of l and t. NoteFig. 7. Computation time for the STNP.that the jPBC library allows precomputation of operations, thereby
trading storage capacity for speed in the computations. Based on
two cases, with or without precomputation, Fig. 3 depicts the com-
putation time for the patient and Fig. 4 depicts the computation
time for the hospital. X-label denotes the ﬁle block number and
Y-label denotes the computation time (ms) for the patient and
the hospital. The computation times for the members with and
without precomputation are depicted in Figs. 5 and 6, respectively.
X-label denotes the ﬁle block number and Y-label denotes the com-
putation time (ms) for committee members. After that, the compu-
tation times for the STNP and for the cloud service are depicted in
Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. In Fig. 7, X-label denotes the number of
committee members and Y-label denotes the computation time
(ms) for STNP. In Fig. 8, X-label denotes the ﬁle block number
and Y-label denotes the computation time (ms) for CS.
In order to show the feasibility of our proposed scheme in
concrete terms, we consider a more realistic case for a hospital.
We assume the one-day transactions of a hospital take 1 GB. These
data will be stored in CS. Let the hash function h1 be SHA-1, which
maps 1 MB to 160 bits. Thus, the 1 GB data can be split into 1024
blocks of 1 MB each. According to the implementation, for 1024
blocks, every entity’s time cost is given below: (1) The patient’s
time cost is 5025 ms = 5.025 s with precomputation and
34,163 ms = 34.163 s without precomputation. (2) The hospital’s
time cost is 2565 ms = 2.565 s with precomputation and
17034 ms = 17.034 s without precomputation. (3) When there are
8 members, every member’s time cost is 5106 ms = 5.106 s with
precomputation and 34176 ms = 34.176 s without precomputa-
tion. (4) CS’s time cost is 7265 ms = 7.265 s with precomputation
and 51,159 ms = 51.159 s without precomputation. The implemen-
tation results show that our proposed protocol is practical. Com-
pared to the other remote data integrity checking schemes
[30,31], our scheme has better efﬁciency. When the data are
1 GB, they are split into 1024 blocks in our scheme while they will
be split into 8 1024 1024 1024=160 ¼ 51:22 blocks in Refs.
[30,31]. A larger block number results in lower efﬁciency. On the
other hand, besides remote data integrity checking, our scheme
has also another important security property, fair remote remote
data retrieval, not offered by [30,31].5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an efﬁcient pairing-based FRR
scheme which can check and retrieve remote data between
H. Wang et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 226–233 233untrusted members. We formally proved that the scheme is secure
under the standard CDH assumption. Our performance analysis
and implementation show that our scheme is efﬁcient.
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